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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The plaintiff seeks to have the Supreme Court modify the 
alimony award entered by Judge Hanson in the Third Judicial 
District Court, The plaintiff believes that the amount and 
duration of the alimony award is excessive based upon the health 
condition of the appellant and the income and resources available 
to the parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order of Judge Timothy R. 
Hanson in a divorce action heard in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, A trial was 
held in this matter on October 11, 1984. A Memorandum Decision 
was issued by Judge Hanson on the 22nd day of October, 1984, and 
an Order to Show Cause was heard by Judge Hanson on the 4th of 
April, 1985, to clarify his Memorandum Decision. Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Divorce Decree were entered in 
this matter on the 16th day of May, 1985. The appeal date in 
this case was extended until June 13, 1985, by an Order of Judge 
Hanson pursuant to Rule 4e of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This appeal was filed on June 12, 1985. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on November 20, 1959, and there 
were two children of the marriage: Jennifer and James. At the 
time of the divorce hearing, the 11th of October, 1984, Jennifer 
was 18 years of age but had not completed high school; and James 
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was 14 years of age. The parties had been separated since March 
of 1982. (Reporter's Transcript [RT.] Volume [V.] II, page [p] 
87) 
At the time of the divorce decree, the respondent, Doroth; 
Ann Armstrong, was 49 years of age and had no significant health 
problems. (RT.- V. II, p. 86) The respondent has a Bachelor of 
Science Degree from the University of Utah in education and 
taught school for five to six years. Her last teaching job was 
in 1970. However, she has renewed her teaching certificate sine* 
that time. (RT. V. II, p. 88) The respondent made no serious 
effort to obtain a job between March 1982 and January 1984. 
Between January of 1984 and October of 1984 she applied at two 
school districts, but did not attempt to find any other type of 
employment. (RT. V. II, p. 90) At the divorce hearing the 
respondent was asked, "Question, The truth of the matter is, you 
don't intend to do anything to contribute to your own support if 
you don't have to? Answer: That is the truth." (RT. V. II p. 
90-91) Judge Hanson, on page 15 of his Memorandum Decision, 
found that "...the evidence the Court received from the defendant 
during the course of the trial, suggests the defendant's efforts 
at employment indicate that her attempts and intentions are less 
than satisfactory. The defendant, if she intends to live in the 
manner that she has been accustomed, even during the period of 
separation between the parties will have to actively seek and 
obtain employment in the field in which she is qualified." 
(Record p. 256) Prior to the divorce hearing in October of 1984, 
the plaintiff was required, on a temporary basis, to pay to the 
plaintiff the sum of $1,600.00 per month. (RT. V. I, p, 134) 
At the time of the divorce the appellant was 51 years of 
age. When the parties separated in approximately March of 1982, 
the appellant was employed as the Executive Vice President of 
Farm Bureau Insurance Company. (RT. V. I, p. 132) The appellant 
lost that job and prior to the divorce hearing began to receive 
disability payments from CNA Insurance Company. That insurance 
company had made a determination that the appellant was 
permanently and totally disabled. Based upon that determination, 
the appellant had been receiving $2,000.00 per month since 
January 1, 1984, although he only received $1,363.00 for the 
month of September, 1984. The appellant does not receive any 
Social Security payments. (RT. V. I, p. 87-89) The appellant, 
at the time of the divorce hearing, received rent on duplexes 
owned by the parties in the amount of $450.00 per month; income 
from a trust held in the name of the children in the sum of 
$524.00 per month; and income from rental unit number 7 in Valley 
Terraces in the sum of $575.00 per month. (RT. V. I, p. 67, 72) 
Judge Hanson ordered that the duplex be sold immediately and that 
the equity be divided among the parties. (Record p. 250 and 325) 
The funds held in the trust account for the children consisted of 
the income received from the sale of Unit No. 4 of Valley 
Terraces. That money was placed in a trust for the children in 
1982 because of the appellant's ill health and his desire to 
insure that the children had funds for their education and to go 
on a mission if they desired. (RT. V. I, p. 71-72) Unit No. 7 
of Valley Terraces, on which the appellant was receiving $575.00 
per month as of October of 1984, was valued at approximately 
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$78,000.00 and had existing indebtedness against it in the 
approximate sum of $82,000.00, Payments on that unit were over 
year delinquent and $10,000.00 in arrears. The appellant 
expected Unit No. J to be taken over by Utah Bank and Trust in 
the immediate future. (RT, V. I, p. 73-74) The appellant owned 
an interest in six other units located in Valley Terraces, Thos< 
units were sold for $214,304,00 at a sheriff's sale by Citizen's 
Bank and Trust on July 29, 1984, The outstanding obligations 
against the six units were $607,889.00, The appellant is 
personally liable for the remaining balance of approximately 
$393,000.00. (RT. V. I, p. 73-76) The defendant's monthly 
expenses amounted to $1,557.00 which did not include the debts hi 
was required to pay on a monthly basis as set forth in the 
appellant's Exhibit P-5. (RT. V, I, p. 127, Exhibits P-5 and 
P-6) 
The appellant has a serious health and blood problem and 
was treated for that problem by Dr. J. F. Orme, Sr. The doctor 
testified in detail concerning the appellant's health problem. 
(RT. V. I, p. 5-23) The doctor testified that the appellant's 
health condition was permanent and that without surgery his 
condition would become worse. (RT. V. I, p. 23 and 15) Without 
surgery the appellant's condition could worsen to the point that 
he would go into congestive heart failure and die. (RT. V. I, p. 
16) The doctor testified that the risk of surgery was great. 
He stated that he has operated on three patients with conditions 
similar to that of the appellant and two of the three have died. 
(RT. V. p. 17-18) The appellant is receiving medications for 
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the purposes of forestalling a stroke and to control his heart 
condition. Those medications are Coumadin, digoxin, propranolol, 
and verapinil. (RT. V. I, p. 18-19) The appellant suffers side 
effects from the medication, including nausea, vomiting, reduced 
appetite, diarrhea, irregular heart beat, depression, central 
nervous system problems, and fatigue, (RT. V. I, p. 19-20) 
Because of the heart condition, the appellant suffers from 
fatigue, inability to concentrate, a loss of sleep, and an 
increase of worry. (RT. V. I, p. 20) The doctor testified that 
the appellantfs health condition would affect his ability to hold 
a job and there would be limits upon his physical exertion, his 
mental concentration, and his ability to withstand emotional 
strain. (RT. V. I, p. 22-23) A medical report was written by 
the doctor concerning the appellantfs health and is marked as 
Exhibit P-8. 
In June of 1983, the appellant was in the hospital for 
approximately one and a half weeks for a cardiac conversion. On 
July 15, 1983, he was again admitted to the hospital for the same 
type of problem and was treated with electrical shock and given 
quinidine. Since July of 1983, he has received emergency 
treatment on two occasions when his heart beat exceeded 160 beats 
per minute. He is in a constant state of cardiac arrhythmia. 
(RT. V. I, p. 129-131) The appellant testified that because of 
his health condition he suffers pain, lack of ability 
to sleep at night, tiredness, and lack of emotional stability. 
(RT. V. I, p. 131-132) 
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The Court found that the parties owned a home acquired 
during their marriage. Said home had an equity in the amount of 
$96,400.00. The Court awarded the home to the respondent with a 
lien in favor of the appellant in the sum of $48,200.00 to be 
paid when the respondent sells the home, remarries, or when the 
youngest child reaches 18. (Record p. 246) The Court ordered 
that the duplex from which the appellant had been receiving 
$450.00 per month, be sold immediately and that the equity 
therein be divided so that both parties would receive 
approximately $3^,000.00. (Record p. 250 and 325) The Court 
awarded the appellant the interest in Valley Terraces, including 
any funds not committed to a trust, and required the appellant tc 
assume $400,000.00 worth of indebtedness owed thereon. The Court 
said that if the funds from Unit No. 4 of Valley Terraces were ir 
a legitimate trust, then the trust should continue to be held for 
the children and distributed in accordance with the terms of the 
trust. (Record p. 248 - 253) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellant contends that Judge Hanson abused his 
discretion in awarding the respondent permanent alimony in the 
amount of $1,000.00 per month. The respondent possesses more of 
the family assets and has a greater earning capacity than does 
the appellant by reason of the appellantfs physical health. 
Consequently, the appellant should not be required to pay 
alimony, or said alimony should be phased out so that it 
terminates by the time the youngest child reaches majority. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE ALIMONY AWARD MADE BY THE LOWER COURT IS EXCESSIVE 
AND UNREASONABLE IN LIGHT OF THE INCOME AND RESOURCES 
AVAILABLE TO THE APPELLANT, 
This Court in the case of DeMar Jones vs. Harriet H. 
Jones, File No. 18733 (filed on April 17, 1985) set forth the 
guideline that should be applied by a Court in determining the 
amount and duration of alimony. While the facts of that case are 
not similar to the facts in this case, the standard annunciated 
by the Court should apply in all divorce actions. The Court 
citing English vs. English, 565 P. 2nd at 411, stated that the 
three factors that should be considered in affixing alimony were: 
(1) The financial conditions and need of the wife, (2) The 
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself, 
and (3) The ability of the husband to provide support. The Court 
also made reference to the assets available to the parties and 
the life style of the couple prior to the divorce. It is the 
position of the appellant that the application of these standard 
to the case presently pending before this Court will demonstrate 
that the District Court Judge abused his discretion in fixing 
permanent alimony in the sum of $1,000.00 per month. 
The evidence presented to the Court clearly established 
that the appellant has a permanent, deteriorating health 
condition and that his ability to work is severely limited 
because of the effects of that health condition and the side 
effects of the medication he is required to take. Those 
limitations include nausea, loss of appetite, loss of sleep, 
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depression, loss of energy and interest, lack of ability to 
concentrate, and physical fatigue. The appellant's health 
condition can only be corrected with high risk surgery. (RT. V. 
I, p. 5-23, 129-132) In contrast, the respondent is 
approximately two years younger than the appellant and is in gooc 
health. (RT. V. II, p. 86) The respondent has a Bachelor of 
Science Degree from the University of Utah and holds a current 
teaching certificate. (RT. V. II, p. 88) The respondent 
testified in Court that she had not made serious efforts to 
obtain employment since she separated from the appellant in 1982, 
and that she did not intend to obtain employment and contribute 
to the support of herself and her children unless she had to. 
(RT. V. II, p. 87, 90-91) Judge Hanson concluded that the 
respondent had not made reasonable efforts to contribute to her 
own support. (Record p. 252) 
The income available to the appellant at the time of the 
divorce decree consisted of $2,000.00 disability payments, 
$575.00 from the rental of Unit No. 7 of Valley Terraces, $450.00 
from the rents received from the duplex belonging to the parties, 
and $525.00 per month from the children's trust. (RT. V. I, p. 
67, 72, 87-89) The $575.00 income from Unit No. 7 of Valley 
Terraces was expected to terminate in the immediate future. The 
appellant owed $4,000.00 more on the unit than it was worth, had 
not made a payment on the unit in over a year, and was delinquent 
in payments in the approximate sum of $10,000.00. (RT. V. I, p. 
70-71*) The Court ordered that the duplex belonging to the 
parties be sold immediately. (Record p. 325 - 326) The sale, 
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of course, would terminate that source of income to the 
appellant. At the time of the divorce hearing, the appellant 
was receiving $3,550.00 per month from all sources. The Court 
knew that the appellant was going to lose the $575.00 per month 
from Unit No. 7 and that he would lose the income from the duplex 
as soon as it was sold, thereby reducing his income in the 
immediate future to $2,525.00. The appellant was required to pay 
$1,600.00 per month as alimony and child support, leaving him a 
balance of $925.00. The appellant's expenses exceeded $1,500.00 
per month, plus the debts listed as Exhibit P-5. (RT. V. I, p. 
127 and Exhibits P-5 and P-6) 
The respondent is an educated, licensed teacher, who has 
the ability to obtain current employment and contribute to her 
own support. The appellant has a permanent health condition 
which will deteriorate and which limits his energies and 
abilities to contribute to his own support. The appellant has no 
assets available to him other than the moneys he is to receive 
from the duplex when it is sold, and his disability income. The 
respondent has available to her the use of the parties' home, her 
half of the equity to be obtained from the sale of the duplex, 
and her ability to earn an income as a teacher. The evidence 
demonstrates that the respondent has more income potential and 
more assets than does the appellant. Under the circumstances, it 
is the position of the appellant that he should not be required 
to pay any alimony, or in the alternative the alimony be reduced 
each year so that it terminates by the time the youngest child 
reaches majority. Without such a reduction or termination, the 
respondent will not attempt to contribute to her own support. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The appellant contends that Judge Hanson abused his 
discretion in awarding the respondent permanent alimony in the 
amount of $1,000,00 per month. It is the position of the 
appellant that his health condition limits his ability to produce 
an income and that the respondent possesses a greater ability to 
produce an income from employment because of her education and 
health than does the appellant. The appellant also maintains 
that the respondent is in possession of greater assets than the 
appellant in that she has been awarded the use of the home and 
one-half of the equity accumulated by the parties during the 
marriage and has not been required to assume any of the major 
indebtedness incurred by the parties during the marriage. That 
the appellant has been required to pay approximately $400,000,00 
worth of indebtedness and will not have access to his share of 
the equity in the parties home until such time as the respondent 
remarries or the youngest child reaches 18 years of age. Given 
the facts presented before the Court, the appellant contends that 
the plaintiff should not be awarded any alimony, and in the event 
the Court determines she should be awarded alimony, said alimony 
should be phased out so that it terminates by the time the 
youngest child reaches majority. 
DATED this day of October, 1985. 
ROBERT A, ECHARD 
Attorney for Appellant 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify four (4) copies of the foregoing brief 
were mailed, postage prepaid, this day of October, 1985, to 
E. H. Fankhauser, Attorney for Respondent, 660 South 200 East, 
Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
635 - 25TH STREET 
OGDEN, UT 84401 
801-621-3317 
PILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County. Utah 
MAY 2113*) 
H. Dixon HintfWy. ClerJ^3rd Oist Gourt-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DELBERT C. ARMSTRONG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOROTHY ANN ARMSTRONG, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. D 8 2-3694 
Based upon the Motion of the plaintiff and the Stipulation 
of the parties, in good cause appearing, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the period in which the parties 
are allowed to app'eal from the aDove captioned matter is extended 
for a period of 30 days in conformance with Rule 4E of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure which extension would require that 
the parties file an appeal prior to Jun/l4, 1985 in the above 
captioned matter. 
DATED this M day of May, /9i 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HtNDlfy 
* $»^4J»y8gg% 
3oi 
Salt Lake County, Utat 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DELBERT C. ARMSTRONG, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CIVIL NO. D-82-3694 
vs. : 
DOROTHY ANN ARMSTRONG, : 
Defendant. : 
The above-referenced matter came on for trial October 11, 
1984. Both parties were present and represented by counsel. 
The Court took evidence and the matter continued through October 
12, 1984. Counsel for the respective parties made their closing 
arguments, urging upon the Court their respective proposed divisions 
of property, alimony, support and other issues presented during 
the course of the trial. The Court took the matter under advisement 
to consider the evidence, review and consider the exhibits received 
during the course of the trial. The Court has now reviewed 
the testimony, reviewed the exhibits received during the course 
of the trial and the pleadings on file in this matter, and being 
otherwise fully advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
There are a number of issues that need to be addressed 
separately by the Court, the issues remaining for decision are 
identified as follows: 
1. The Divorce. 
TRONG V. ARMSTRONG PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
plaintiff cruelly, causing him great mental distress and 
rering. 
The Court f i n d s t h a t the defendant on her Counterclaim 
establ i shed s u f f i c i e n t grounds for grant ing a d i v o r c e in 
favor and against the p l a i n t i f f . o n the basis of mental cruel ty 
that the p l a i n t i f f has through h i s words and act ions treated 
> defendant c r u e l l y , caus ing her grea t mental d i s t r e s s and 
rfering. 
The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties 
this matter in that the requirements of residency have been 
tablished. 
The Court determines that because this matter has been 
file for in excess of two years, that there is no chance 
reconciliation between the parties, the relationship having 
steriorated substantially, that good cause exists for waiving 
ne interlocutory period and the divorce should become final 
pon this Court signing and entering the Findings of Fact, Con-
lusions of Law, and the Decree. 
. CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD AND VISITATION 
There are two children as issue as a result of this marriage, 
'he oldest child has recently reached age 18, but still has 
:he last year of high school to complete. The evidence shows 
:hat the oldest child of the parties will complete high school 
Dn or about June 1, 1985. The parties have a second child who 
ARMSTRONG V. ARMSTRONG PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
2. Custody of the minor child. 
3. Visitation of the minor child. 
4. Division of the residence. 
5. Division of the duplex. 
6. Division of the interests in the Valley Terraces 
Condominium complex in Ogden, Utah. 
7. Division of the Idaho accounts. 
8. Division of the retirement through the plaintiff's 
employment. 
9. The amount of child support for the minor child. 
10. The amount of alimony. 
11. Division of household furniture and furnishings, 
including personal property of the parties. 
12. Division of the vehicles. 
13. Distribution of the life insurance policies and 
designation of beneficiaries. 
14. The advisability of a mutual Restraining Order. 
15. Awarding of attorney's fees as may be appropriate. 
1. DIVORCE - RESIDENCY, GROUNDS, INTERLOCUTORY PERIOD 
The Court finds that the plaintiff on his Complaint has 
established sufficient grounds for granting a divorce in his 
favor and against the defendant on the basis of mental cruelty 
in that the defendant has through her words and actions treated 
P ^ 
RONG V. ARMSTRONG PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
:ill in his minority. The parties have agreed and stipulated 
custody of the minor child shall be with the defendant. 
Visitation is in dispute. Based upon all the evidence, 
Court determines that absent an agreement between the parties 
t period of visitation is appropriate. The Court determines 
a visitation schedule with the oldest child who has now 
shed her majority would be inappropriate, and the plaintiff 
the oldest child of the parties will make their own respective 
isions regarding the contact between the two of them. The 
rt finds that visitation with the minor son should be every 
ter weekend, commencing Friday evening at 6:00 p.m. and continuing 
Sunday evening at 6:00 p.m. Visitation should also be every 
her red letter holiday, with the exception of Christmas, 
liday visitations should be so structured to insure that the 
me holidays do not fall with the same parent each year. In 
edition to every other holiday, the plaintiff should have visitation 
:ivileges with the minor son of the parties commencing on Christmas 
ay at 1:00 p.m. and continuing through 8:00 p.m. that evening. 
n addition to the foregoing, in absence of an agreement of 
he parties, the Court determines that an extended period of 
isitation during the summer with the minor son would be appropriate 
is to the plaintiff, and Orders that a period of three weeks 
luring the summer when the minor son is out of school is an 
appropriate period of time. 
ARMSTRONG V. ARMSTRONG PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court recognizes that the minor son of the parties 
is old enough so that his outside interests, sports activities, 
school activities, and activities with peers are important, 
and. should be considered carefully by the plaintiff in exercising 
his visitation. The minor son should be consulted regarding 
visitation, and it is the Court's intention that the plaintiff 
should be sensitive to the needs and obligations of the miner 
son in exercising the plaintiff's right of visitation, 
3. RESIDENCE 
The parties have acquired a home during the course of the 
marriage in Salt Lake County. Inasmuch as there is a minor 
child at home with the defendant, and the oldest child of the 
parties still resides at home while attending high school, even 
though she has reached her majority, the defendant should be 
awarded the residence, subject to the ongoing mortgage thereon, 
and subject to a lien in favor of the plaintiff against the 
home representing his share of the equity as set forth in the 
following paragraph. The equity of the plaintiff in the home 
shall be due and payable six months from the occurrence of any 
of the following events: (1) Defendant remarries or an adult 
male not a blood relative resides in the home; (2) the defendant 
sells the residence; (3) the youngest child reaches age 18 or 
completes high school, whichever is later. 
<A<U> 
rRONG V* ARMSTRONG PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Both sides have submitted expert testimony with regard 
the fair market value of the real properties held by the 
:ies, including the residence which is the subject of this 
agraph. The evaluations of the experts presented by both 
ties vary by approximately $25,000.00. Considering the background 
experience of the experts, their candor and understanding 
the accuracy of their evaluations, and taking into account 
>airs that are required on the home, the Court determines 
it the appraisal offered by the defendant in the total amount 
$126,000.00 as the fair market value of the house is the 
:e reliable evaluation. The mortgage on the residence is 
the approximate amount of $29,600.00, leaving an equity* available 
r distribution of approximately $96,400.00. Based upon the 
ngth of the marriage and the size of the equity, together 
th the property distributions set forth elsewhere in this 
cision, the Court determines that a fair and reasonable distri-
ttion of the equity would be to allot and assign fifty percent 
: the equity in the home to each party. Accordingly, the lien 
: the plaintiff against the residence shall be in the sum of 
48,200.00. The equity will be payable as set forth in the 
receding paragraph, and if the defendant sells the home to 
atisfy the plaintiff's lien, one-half of the fair and reasonable 
xpenses in selling the home, including real estate commission 
ill be charged against the plaintiffs equity. The lien will 
<J.+ 7 
ARMSTRONG V. ARMSTRONG PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
bear no interest until the expiration of six months beyond the 
happening of the three events requiring the payment of plaintiff's 
equity. If the equity is not paid when due, it will bear interest 
at the maximum legal rate. It is the intention of the Court 
that the defendant hold title to the house, subject to a lien, 
and accordingly the necessary documents transferring title to 
the defendant from the plaintiff and the creation of a written 
lien in the amount of $48,200.00 should be accomplished by the 
parties forthwith. 
4. DUPLEX 
As with the residence, both parties submitted evidence 
through their respective experts regarding the fair market value 
of the duplex income property. The Court is of the opinion 
considering the plaintiff's high estimate of fair market value, 
and the defendant's estimate of low fair market value, that 
the two should be compromised, and that the fair market value 
is $115,500.00. The evidence shows that there is an outstanding 
mortgage of approximately $7,000.00 on the premises, which would 
leave an equity available for distribution of $108,500.00. 
The Court notes that in 1972 the defendant's mother paid 
$18,250.00 to the plaintiff and defendant purportedly for an 
interest in the duplex. There was no evidence of the debt other 
than a note which purports to bear interest at the rate of 10% 
per annum. The evidence is undisputed that the $18,250.00 was 
cZ^ 
TROflii,r ti r,„ nwfCTRONG PAGE EIGHT MEMORANDUM DECISION 
r e p a i d n u t s u a n t rn run NUIH m o t h e r w i s e p r i o r to t h e d i .u 'h 
t ii« i PIHJ 1  mi I i 11 I !•* i lie p n d e n r e i s l i s * . n d i s p u t e d 
;:;: t h e r e were no documents t r a n s t e r 1 \ i ,\ m i e 
p e r t v " * h^ p l a i n t i f f ' s m o t h e r p r i n r i in IHML iiedlii u i i h 
e x c e p t * "I P M I I I I M innna rpd rv !• IIH p l a i n t i f f s u g g e s t s 
t i t c r e a t e s a l i v i n g t i u s t tot o u y - h a i i In li • 
st i i \\)v e v i d e n c e ml • i n p o e t s tiie p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a l l 
t i e s had t r e a t e d the ' ' „ . , ayment F"kr i n t e r e s t 
o n e - h a l t of t he duplex a s s i g n e d to Uie de t ei idan i "" i i n r . 
asTM ' i i !"• i e f^ndan t " s mother has cued and her e s t a t e U-> 
bn e 11 p i u fa a t eo 11 m 11 i 111 i i d e o i4 w 11 J 11 « I i m m 1 1 ' u in 1 / t w o 
i r s of the d e f e n d a n t ' s mother a r e the d e f e n d a n t aiiJ a SiStet, 
o f f s e t • , l h r i h a ," - M h#- r ^ d e for the § 1 3 , 2 5 0 . 0 1 ' n o t e 
w wned by the d e f e n d a n t and l i t : -.i'-it»i i«> » . , * , . . , 
y e q u i t y between t h e p l a i n t i f f and t n e d e f e n c e 
• iMun -Hi IL ibl i <M:I i mi if fliin M' 1 :.:f f'i c* e^t e v i d e n c e f > e s t a b l i s h 
ta t a c t u a l t r u e and c o r r e c t t i t l e ** - -. - d / i s r e : - r -
) t ; h e r , and c e r t a i n l y iiu p r o b a t e was commenced to c r e a t e t i t l e 
i i, tie es i,.'j i, I-1 in in h"» rVnri-ti i « iniio!-bor thif* r o u l d pas s to t h e 
2 f e nd a n t a a 4 h e r s i s I e i a s I k - a i u I M r xi, m * • J I S 1 111 i 1111 m i 
as c a l c u l a t e d t h e n o t e of $ 1 8 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 a t 10'i s i m p l e i n t e r e s t 
o iiiiiiiii int compound I nq t h e i n t e r e s t 
c c u m a l a t e d duri?=- lat p e r i o d oi I i nnj t n e t e i \ im M nn ef e s t 
ue of $!M, , 9 0 0 . 0 0 . Triat added tu tfie u r i g i n a l no te uf $ 1 8 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 
*?<£> 
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brings the amount due under the note to $40,150.00. $40,150.00 
is rightfully the interests of the defendant and her sister, 
and should be subtracted from the total equity available for 
distribution of $108,500.00, leaving a balance of $68,350.00. 
The Court is of the opinion that a fair distribution of 
the equity between the plaintiff and the defendant, taking all 
matters into consideration as required under the decisions of 
the Utah Supreme Court and the statutes of this state, together 
with the nature and division of properties and assets set forth 
elsewhere in this Memorandum Decision, that fifty percent of 
the net available proceeds of the equity in the duplex should 
be awarded to both the plaintiff and the defendant, for a total 
of $34,175.00 to each. The Court is not taking into account 
the interest that the defendant may have in the $40,150.00 based 
upon the promissory note. 
The Court determines that the duplex should be sold, from 
the net proceeds, $40,150.00 shall be distributed to the defendant 
and her sister for distribution among them as they see fit, 
that the outstanding mortgage of approximately $7,000.00 be 
paid, and that the remaining $68,350.00, more or less depending 
on the actual sale price of the duplex, be divided equally between 
the plaintiff and the defendant. Each party should bear one-half 
of the costs of sale, including reasonable real estate fees. 
Each party will bear their respective tax liability with regard 
STRONG V. ARMSTRONG PACE TEN MEMLKANu'M MLCI I.N 
t h e s a l e of t h e p r o p e r t i e s i '" " « . i n t e n t ' « » : a i v e d , The 
:t IPs ijre o r d e r e d t i c o o p e r a t e in t h e sa l e , ... 1 ' l i t J ^ ' I M I C , 
I iiiii i l ,ijiL'"]i t urn 11 r o c c u r Si t h e p l a i n t i f f s h a l l 
i t i n u e t o o p e r a t e t h e d u p l e x , s l id! i espoiis \» If i , i »• •• 
L i .4 "i 1 i 'iifi- niiiirl (Ti.i i n t e n a n c p » and may c o l l e c t and d i s p o s e .1 
a net c e n t s ao the pLa.i.1 i l l ,. i n s u r i n q t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y 
p r o p e r l v m a i n t a i n e d and c a r e d f o r , and i« J S
 t . M i " H , " ' 
i p a y i n g l h i 'I ' | a t i o n s o i a l imony and suppor t s e t foi th n> 
t i s D e c i s i o n . 
. 'VALLEY TERRACES CONDOMINIUM PROJECT 
The e v i d e n c e n'.ippor t s thn f i n d i n g t h a t t h e V a l l e y T e r r a c e s 
r o j e c t was p r i n c i p a l l y the projei. 'i i i ln» pli-i ni-.ifi Defendan t 
•iis rint p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e vent, . c - f i n a n c i a l l y , e x c e p t whwn 
e t i nbt? i ii,iii(.'tf s nsHtl , wit: • * v •> * knowledge and c o n s e n t , 
,o s e c u r e a p o r t i o n of t h e lomi mi ~j, :. ,«uL I II i-n I he d e f e n d a n t 
lecame a w a r e t h a t h e r i n h e r i t a n c e had been p l e d q e d , she ((.n k 
:he appropr i j t u ,'
 L , ' i » .i1 ' funds h o ther s e c u r i t y 
#as s u b s t i t u t e d w,iiit-» LIIH p r o j e c t lu ,, . , . u / c e s s f il 
F i n a n c i a l l y , it" HOPS p r o d u c e some income to che p l a i n t i f f «' 
the p r e s e n t I IIHH I HI m1 m I IIII in If r e s i d e s in one of t h e u n i t s . 
I t a p p e a r s t h a t t he coupon a t ion whii 'h > r u ) *•  t , In , 
t h o s e u n i t s s o l d i s t o t a l l y owned by t h e p l a i n t i f f and t!it-
p r o p e r t i e s a r e l i k e ! , , " i » '"" i n \ i li f o r e c l o s u r r by t h * 
u n d e r l y i n g l e n d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s , ' i . JHHH.I . I t" , Mi, 
^r/ 
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potential of substantial deficiencies being assessed against 
the plaintiff and/or his corporation if the property is foreclosed. 
The majority of the project was developed while the parties 
were separated, and as the defendant did not invest her funds, 
together with the fact the project was not a marital endeavor, 
equity requires this Court to assess the liability of the loss 
of the project against the plaintiff if it cannot be salvaged. 
Likewise, any income, profits or monies that might be received 
in connection with the project are awarded to the plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the Valley Terraces Project in Ogden, Utah, 
together with any interest in any condominiums or units now 
held by the corporation or the plaintiff in his individual capacity 
are awarded to the plaintiff subject to a*ny liabilities on the 
project, including tax consequences if any, and that the plaintiff 
shall hold the defendant harmless from any liability on that 
project that she may have. 
Evidence was produced and the plaintiff claims that the 
proceeds from the sale of one of the units has been assigned 
to an irrevocable trust plaintiff set up by himself for the 
benefit of the parties' children. A trust document has been 
prepared according to the plaintiff's testimony, but was not 
produced at the time of trial. At present the evidence shows 
that a sum is received monthly with regard to the sale of the 
aforementioned condominium unit, and that the plaintiff has 
^ r ^ 
Th '*i> .»M=,TRf)N.G PAGE TWELVE MEMORANDUM. DECISION 
p laced t h o s e funds in r r ' j r t A b a l l o o n payment i IJ * i n.i i-1 y 
~ r i „,-1 ,»r, tr about J a n u a c 1 ', he 
i has i n s u f f i c i t n e v i d e n c e uy ' O l d ' my * y(»»j 
c "i I ' s smn is r whether ot not the t r u s t Lm* a d a a n , li* *• 
,1'r-Kl, oi whvLho * if H " ' i i r r e n t i y b e i n q r e c e i v e d 
t o he r e c e i v e d January uL i ' i . L * .i . i i 1 ' • ^ r rne 
s t i f v f u iii 'nis t h a t a r e not c u r r e n t l y r*Tnni tteci <u a l u s t , 
,uming J .I . " i O H HI* awarded to H I P p l a i n t i f f 
; h i s u se and b e n e f i t in a t t e m p t i n g i , j i > 
: i: a i.( e b i1 ir- ' » • iTif i s f y h i s o t h e r o b l i g a t i o n s in c o n n e c t i o n 
e r e w i t h . If the IUCILL» be i M I e» *-I OV ,,- , > be t e r p j V P J a r, e 
e l e q i t i m a t e p r o p e r t y of t h e t i u s t , t h e n uf c o u r s e thos•;' iumls 
ouid '.."JI11! j"j|fci ' « Held in t r u s t as i n d i c a t e d by Hie t r u s t . 
PERSONAL PROPERTY, HOUSEHOLD E'UKNITURE ANU FURNISHINGS 
Each n a r t y awarded t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p e r s o n a l c l u t h i » | 
id personci l pus^-- nn I MM i i M m t iff i s to r e c e i v e the f u r n i t u r e 
id f u r n i s h i n g s . h i s p o s s e s s i o n a* oil:1 poo sent i i ine The 
^ fendan t 1 s re r e c e i v e t h e f u r n i t u r e and f u r n i s h i n g s p r e s e n c l y 
ni
 hm p o s s e s s ui'i Willi '"I li " « r p p t ion of t h e p l a i n t i f f f s hand 
00 I s whi ch were g 1 ven t u li 1 in LJy li 1 ',J l, a tlie ,r w! 11 Mt 1 I o, Jo f eroiant 
b^M r e t u r n to the p l a i n t i f f f o r t h w i t h . 
' , DEBTS 
P l a i n t i f f i s o r d e r e d t o assume and pay an J hu(u i.iiw oWoo'<J'* « 
l a r m l e s s m t h e d e b t s and o b l i g a t i o n s as l i s t e d on E x h i b i t P - v , 
. - ^ 
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with the exception as to those liabilities that have been otherwise 
provided for in this opinion. 
8. VEHICLES 
The plaintiff is awarded the Chrysler automobile and the 
debt outstanding thereon. While the Court recognizes that the 
defendant will require transportation as the Chrysler automobile 
does not function at the present time and the cost to repair 
the same is substantial in relation to its fair market value, 
particularly taking into account the outstanding obligation 
that the Chrysler automobile secures, the defendant will have 
to purchase substitute transportation with her share of the 
property division. The plaintiff is awarded the motorcycle, 
subject to any liability thereon. 
9. ACCOUNTS 
The monies representing the federal 1982 income tax refund, 
less interest, are currently being held in an account in Idaho 
by the plaintiff in the approximate sum of $10,000.00. Plaintiff 
acknowledges that the fund is $1,500.00 short, due to his withdrawal 
of interest and funds through various transfers since the federal 
1982 income tax refund was received. The state tax return of 
approximately $3,400.00 was being held by plaintiff's prior 
attorney. There is some evidence that the state tax returns 
being held in trust may have been used to pay plaintiff's attorney's 
fees. If so, such a distribution of the state income tax refund 
^ t r y 
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i -jDpear to be in v i o l a t i o n or \\\ '• •... • t4 c. Order p r o h i b i t i n g 
e u d , -- *• - * - i t h o u t Order ot toe L O I i i, n t:» f Mrt 
i n e s t o t ake any j c l i-m eqard to the i s s u e nt contempt 
he p r e s e n t t i m e , p r e s e r v i n g t h a t ISSUW '••! £:»/rt h,.>r d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
n e c e s s a t i "Tak , n , i n t o a c c o u n t t h e s h o r t f a , . <, • u . • ' • . ,l y 
p l a i n t i f f , and t h e a p p a ^ i» >"S' of $ 3 f 4 0 0 . 0 0 on t h e s t a t e 
refurui , $7 ,500 .00 of" t h e amounts heM M "dnho a c c o u n ! 
>uld be L mmed J a f, • I y pa id .;nr,,j i ' ! Kji d e f e n d a n t cr, iitr, 
t h e t o t a l funds t h a t shoul-.l )'»,•« .KM i i ,-ible for d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
. SUPPORT ARREARAGES 
D u r i n g t h e mon ths .J|- O c t o b e r » November and o n e - h i . 
jcember, 1982 the p l a i n t i f f . u,se<i H M U » I I ! a s s e t s , l ) wit t h e 
l i e ot gold s t o c k , to p r o v i d e foe Court Ordered temp \ ai / suppor t 
id a l i m o n y . The b',u. « ,-« i s o l d for a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 41 00 4 . v «f 
ncl p r o v i d e d f o r t h e t e m p o r a r y s u p ^ i '«i ]*> -,-t ^«l f600.00 p e r 
kOntM v »J fj.'1-' i ionths above i n d i c a t e d One-nai l oi ' ^ n,\ j n t s 
r e c e i v e d for t n e S ^ L - w- < ' •* -,!...'»• . \)nc) ind siv^jid t e 
c r e d i t e d i « the d e f e n d a n t 1 s s i d e ,ii • p- t ,1 • i H r ^ n r d i ng I v • 
Lhu dt* i,*• J«J«4 - ^ hp r e i m b u r s e d $ 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 h, -m | ,.-,* , ' 
fo r t h a t por t iu i i ," ^ ,-, , « "he qold s tock whi :h r e p r e s e n t e d 
h e r s h a r e of t h a t i n t e r e s t * The ^„. • •• A I , <Ho,j] 1 he re imbursed 
t o i .i.' .i-Mf j-iiulrini, from t h e p l a i n t i f f s h o u l d De
 t ' u i i P U 
out nf r.ne Idaho J C C J U I . I . 
4 ^  j - ^ 
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11. CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 
The evidence shows that the plaintiff is currently unable 
to work and is receiving disability at a rate which has been 
and will be in the future $2,000.00 per month. In addition 
to the disability income received by the plaintiff, the plaintiff 
is currently receiving rental on condominium unit #7 in the 
amount of $575.00. The plaintiff receives as an interim interest 
payment on unit #4 the condominium sold which has allegedly 
been placed in trust for the children the amount of $524.00. 
From the duplex the plaintiff currently receives a net disposable 
income of $450.00 for a total of $3,449.00. 
The defendant is unemployed and has not been employed during 
the course of the marriage while raising the parties chilren, 
her primary responsibility being running the household and raising 
the children of the parties. The defendant has during the period 
of separation, however, recertified herself as a school teacher 
and has the ability to assist in her support. The evidence 
the Court received from the defendant during the course of the 
trial suggest the defendant's efforts at employment indicate 
that her attempts and intentions are less than satisfactory. 
The defendant if she is to continue to live in the manner that 
she has been accustomed even during the period of separation 
between the parties will have to actively seek and obtain employment 
in the field in which she is qualified. 
MSlHUMt. " 'hill i TH hio • 'ic-Lii MEMORANDUM DEC IS 
R a s e d ijoon t t i ^ iiHfd i of t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e , 
ie a b i l i t y o l J* ' i . ' . l l M M | H l^nqt-n m m e n n r r i a g e , 
I P s t y l e of l i v i n n e n j o y e d by t h e p a i t i ^ j » " i» < i3 
t i,* I,I« f i q e i Miu M s t r i b u t i o n o f t u n o b l i g a t i o n s and 
i i. i in in i ii i b tJet i s i u f j , I 11«« i i 11 "• i- nn i i .• t1 "i d I a t .I i " I ' d 
q u i t a b l p a m o u n t foe c h i l d s u p p o r t i s $U»n Uw p ^ r mou tn f ^ r 
hi h i , i i i 1 i i I IM in i i- i m i n e s th.at* t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o s u p p o r t 
, he d a u g h t e r j t " l ie p a n t i e s wb« '< J -MI in,- i > ' i i i -o i i 
mi IN in 4 ' h o o l biin mi i c o n t i n u e op t IAIVJ i n c l u d i n g thw mui h 
, i JOii.e ' "N dl\ I ' i O i i i h t e r q r i d u a t e s f» ' ^ h i g h s c h o o l 
Z h i l d s u p p o r t f o r t h e ootmut s on ut I jt-» p a r t I M ? W I I it » 
r o n M n u e u n t i l >• , h t ime as he r e a c h e s age 1H <o "ompletes hiqh 
s c h o o l , whiche 'Hi i u m y e i , s u b l e t i hi Id s ippott ' e n d i n q 
a t an e a r l i e r t i m e s h o u l d t h e minor son tie ema it tpdtt H<J pi i 
t" - ili b i r t h d a y The Cour t d e t e r m i n e s b a s e d upon a l l "li-
t h e p r e s e n t ci rcumstanc o I I M ! i in i » f ^ mi.-mu i s in neo»l of ^no 
t h e p l a i n t i f f has l.he a b i l i t y t o pay al imony in t he sum ot
 T«i#il<ln . i 
I *• in M i M i „ 
1
 T h e e v i d e n c e su»j j e j ' , i ' i . " n i r ^ i r u 1 a • I } 
in view of the b a l l o o n payment mi mini ii i , t he s a i e ot tue cumin i 
n» in in rinl t h e p o s s i b i l i t y <»f f o r e c l o s u r e , and t h e s a l e of 
the d u p l e x , t h a t the j>nn i i u « « i f t " - teasn i n t h e 
f u t u r e £ £ ? T h e C o u r t makes t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n ON c h i l d s u p p o r t 
'is •"! 0. 'Mi the present income of the par t ies , and 
jivsr? 
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the present ability of the parties to generate income. Should 
plaintiff's income decrease in the future, the Court will of 
course entertain an appropriate Motion for modification upon 
a showing of change of circumstances. 
In reaching the foregoing figures, the Court not only takes 
into account the factors set forth above, but notes that the 
plaintiff has paid ongoing temporary support in the amount of 
$1,600,00 for a lengthy period of time, and in addition to that 
has spent substantial sums each month on the two minor children, 
all evidencing his ability to meet the obligation even though 
he is not actively employed and is disabled. 
12 . ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Whi l e e a c h s i d e has incurred s u b s t a n t i a l a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , 
i t would be i n e q u i t a b l e f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f t o be r e q u i r e d t o 
pay any s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n of the d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s 
b e c a u s e he has been Ordered t o assume s u b s t a n t i a l d e b t s and 
o b l i g a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y in view of t h o s e o b l i g a t i o n s in the 
condominium p r o j e c t t h a t p o t e n t i a l l y e x i s t . T h e r e f o r e , t h e 
Court de termines that e q u i t y r e q u i r e s t h a t each s i d e bear t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and c o s t s . 
13. LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES 
Each party i s Ordered to maintain the l i f e insurance that 
they p r e s e n t l y have in e f f e c t , and name the ch i ldren of the 
p a r t i e s as b e n e f i c i a r i e s . 
<?s~& 
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MEDICAL INSURANCE 
Rout ine medical, expenses t h a t may be i n c u r r e d for t He <"M • ii-r 
)n whicn t h e p l a i n t i f f i *i p j y u n -lUpport a t ••• !„<.' he pa • 4 i.,1 
f« d e f e n d a n t wi th c h i l d s u p p o r t payments r e c u r , -'''i ' ' ^ o r d i n a r y 
d x c a l K * j»*?"""" s^(i . r t h o d o n t i c e x p e n s e s , , rind m a t t e r s • • i i H J 
t a r e s h a l l be b o r n e e q u - i U j u-'i*i,-> ih. ' MI j i n r i f f and the 
*fM-nirfnif- jf e i t h e r parL> becomes employed miietr, nir,j , ni 
?ntd L i us Li r. Jin " • - ' - i i l a b l e , t h a t p a r t y i s n t d e r e d to o b t a i n 
aid i n s u r a n c e foi the u:%e JW:. «nwi i ' • » c n i i d r e u i u i the* 
er i in l of t ime t h a t c h i l d s u p p o r t i s a p p l i c a b l e . 
5 , MUTUAL RESTRAINING ORDER 
B o t h p a r t i e s have a g r e e d m a t "in M ^ p s t r a i ni n<] Order 
( " •**- a p p r o p r i a t e i n a s m u c h a s t h e r e i s some e v i d e n c e " >uit 
:he p a r i t i e s have made dei iqaMwy riimments t o t h e c h i l d r e n r e g a r d i n g 
the <"'*»nclucl of the o ther p a r t y , Each pai; i r • •« J IM I M •• i t tuu t 
comiiien i , ii j i.pnn d ie conduc t of t h e either p a r t y in t he p r e s e n c e 
of t h e c h i l d r e n . 
1 6 . MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Ea "  n, iM|.i, i '" v i s O r d e r e d "i e x e c u t e the n e c e s s a r y documents 
of t i t l e , deeds cr 'Ji-ier [wpeiii n»*n»ssars> to can*1/ i n t c e f f e c t 
t h e O r d e r s :,T£ t h i s Court in t h i s Memorandum U e e i s i m u 
«"> .II.HI.1.>*".1 i !' -i thi? d e f e n d a n t i s ni p r e p a r e t h e F i n d i n g s of 
F a c t f c o n c l u s i o n m i.-.k, . .h,..,-,"^- .iii t h i s matt*?r „ submit 
t h e same t o c o u n s e l I • r t 'he p l a i n t i f f t o r r e i v e w i - n 
J2S" * 
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and conten t , and upon approval submi t / t he same to the Court 
for signature and f i l i n g . 
Dated this day of Octrb&er, 1984. 
SOTHtf R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. OiXOH KiKDLEY 
Q&&W 
Salt Lako CoLjnfv I't^h 
H. FANKHAUSER 
: No 10 32 
:orney for Do rendu; *-
) South 200 East, Suite 10i. 
Lt Lake City, Utah «4 I 1 1 
Lephone: c^ >-iu t \ 
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of this action; and the Court being advised in the premises rendere 
its Memorandum Decision and in accordance therewith, now makes 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff, at the time of the commencement of this 
action had moved his place of residence to Weber County, State 
of Utah. Defendant, at the time of the commencement of the action 
was a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and had been 
for more than three (3) months prior thereto. The Court finds 
that it has jurisdiction over the parties in that the requirements 
of residency have been established. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on November 20, 
19 59 at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. The Court finds that the Plaintiff on his Complaint 
has established sufficient grounds for granting a divorce in his 
favor against the Defendant on the basis of mental cruelty in 
that the Defendant has, through her words and actions, treated the 
Plaintiff cruelly, causing him great mental distress and suffering. 
The Court finds that the Defendant, on her Counterclaim, has 
established sufficient grounds for granting a divorce in her favor 
against the Plaintiff on the basis of mental cruelty in that the 
Plaintiff has, through his words and actions, treated Defendant 
cruelly, causing her great mental distress and suffering. 
The Court determines that good causes exists for waiving 
the interlocutory period in that this matter has been pending for 
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other red letter holiday, with the exception of Christmas. Holiday 
visitation should be so structured to insure that the same holidays 
do not fall with the same parent each year. In addition to every 
other holiday, the Plaintiff should have visitation privileges 
with the minor son of the parties commencing on Christmas Day at 
1:00 P.M. and continuing through 8:00 P.M. that evening. In additi* 
in absence of an agreement of the parties, the Court determines 
that an extended period of visitation during the summer with the 
minor son would be appropriate as to the Plaintiff and orders that 
a period of three (3) weeks during the summer when the minor son 
is out of school is an appropriate period of time. 
The Court recognizes that the minor son of the parties is 
old enough so that his outside interests, sports activities, 
school activities and activities with peers are important, and 
should be considered carefully by the Plaintiff in exercising his 
visitation. The minor son should be consulted regarding visitation, 
and it is the Court's intention that the Plaintiff should be sensiti 
to the needs and obligations of the minor son in exercising the 
Plaintiff's right of visitation. 
6. During the marriage relationship the parties acquired 
an ownership interest in a home and residence located at 8291 
Etienne Way, Sandy, Utah. Inasmuch as there is a minor child at 
home with the Defendant, and the oldest child of the parties still 
resides at home while attending high school even though she has 
reached her majority, the Defendant should be awarded the residence 
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ject to the ongoing mortgage thereon, and subject to a lien 
favor of the Plaintiff against the home representing his share 
the equity as set forth hereinbelow. The equity of the Plaintiff 
the home shall be due and payable six (6) months from the 
urrence of any of the following events: (1) Defendant remarries 
an adult male, not a blood relative, resides in the home; (2) the 
fendant sells the residence; (3) the youngest child reaches age 
jhteen (18) or completes high school, which ever is later. 
7. The Court finds and determines from the evidence presented 
at the home and residence located at 8291 Etienne Way, Sandy, 
ah, has a fair market value of $126,000.00. The mortgage balance 
t the residence is in the amount of $29,694.61, leaving an equity 
mailable for distribution of $96,305.39. Based on the length of 
le marriage and the size of the equity, together with the property 
istribution set forth elsewhere in this decision, the Court 
etermines that a fair and reasonable distribution of the equity 
ould be to allot and assign fifty (50%) percent of the equity in 
.he home to each party. Accordingly, the lien of the Plaintiff 
Lgainst the residence shall be in the sum of $48,152.69, which 
equity will be payable as set forth in the preceding paragraph. If 
the Defendant sells the home to satisfy the Plaintiff's lien, one-half 
(1/2) of the fair and reasonable expenses in selling the home, 
including real estate commission, will be charged against the Plaintiff's 
equity. The lien of Plaintiff will bear no interest until the expiration 
of six (6) months beyond the happening of the three (3) events 
requiring the payment of Plaintiff*s equity. If the equity is 
not paid when due, it will bear interest at the maximum legal rate 
It. is the intention of the Court that the Defendant hold title 
to the house, subject to a lien, and accordingly, the necessary 
documents transferring title to the Defendant from the Plaintiff 
and the creation of a written lien in the amount of $48,152.69 
should be accomplished by the parties forthwith. 
8. During the marriage relationship, the parties acquired 
an ownership interest in real property consisting of a duplex 
located at 1773-1775 Hubbard Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. Both 
parties submitted evidence regarding the fair market value of the 
duplex income property. The Court finds, from the evidence submitt 
that the fair market value of the duplex is $115,500.00. The 
evidence shows that there is an outstanding mortgage of approximate 
$7,000.00 on the premises, which should leave an equity available 
for distribution of $108,500.00. 
From the evidence, the Court notes that in 1972 the Defen-
dant's mother paid $18,250.00 to the Plaintiff and Defendant 
purportedly for an interest in the duplex. There was no evidence 
of the debt other than a note which purports to bear interest at 
the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum. The evidence is undispute< 
that the $18,250.00 was not repaid pursuant to the note or otherwise 
prior to the death of Defendant's mother. The evidence is also 
undisputed that there were no documents transferring any interest 
in the property to the Defendants mother prior to her death, with 
the exception that the note prepared by the Plaintiff suggests 
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lat it create a living trust for one-half (1/2) of the duplex 
i question. The evidence also supports the proposition that all 
arties have treated -the $18,250.00 loan as payment for interest 
n one-half (1/2) of the duplex assigned to the Defendant's mother, 
nasmuch as the Defendant's mother had died and her estate has 
ot been probated, and the evidence shows that the only two (2) 
eirs of Defendant's mother are the Defendant and a sister, an 
ffset or allocation should be made for the $18,250.00 note now 
wned by the Defendant and her sister prior to distributing any 
:quity between the Plaintiff and Defendant. The Court is not 
;atisfied that there is sufficient evidence to establish that 
.ctual true and correct title was transferred to the Defendant's 
lother, and certainly no probate was commenced to create title 
„n the estate of Defendant's mother that could pass to the Defendant 
ind her sister as heirs of Mrs. Wells. The Court has calculated 
:he note of $18,250.00 at ten (10%) percent simple interest for the 
fears 1973 through 1984, not compounding the interest accumulated 
luring that period of time there is a total interest due of 
521,900.00. That added to the original note of $18,250.00 brings 
the amount due under the note to $4 0,150.00. $4 0,150.00 is rightfully 
the interest of Defendant and her sister, and should be subtracted 
from the total equity available for distribution of the $108,500.00, 
leaving a balance of $68,350.00. 
The Court is of the opinion that a fair distribution of 
the equity between the Plaintiff and the Defendant that fifty (50%) 
?9 3 
percent of the net available proceeds of the equity in the duplex 
should be awarded to both the Plaintiff and Defendant, for a 
total of $34,175.00 to each. The Court is not taking into account 
the interest that the Defendant may have in the $4 0,150.00 based 
upon the promissory note. 
The Court determines that the duplex should be sold, from 
the net proceeds, $4 0,150.00 shall be distributed to the Defendant 
and her sister for distribution among them as they see fit, that 
the outstanding mortgage of approximately $7,000.00 be paid, and 
the remaining proceeds from the sale of the duplex be divided 
equally between Plaintiff and Defendant. Each party should bear 
one-half (1/2) of the cost of sale, including reasonable real estat 
fees. Each party will bear the respective tax liability with regar 
to the sale of the properties and the amounts received. The 
parties should be ordered to cooperate in the sale of the duplex 
and until such time as the sale occurs, the Plaintiff shall continu 
to operate the duplex, shall be responsible for its obligations 
and maintenance, and may collect and dispose of the net rents as 
the Plaintiff sees fit, insuring that the property is properly 
maintained and cared for, and to assist the Plaintiff in paying the 
obligations of alimony and support set forth in this decision. 
9. During the marriage relationship, the Plaintiff acquired 
a 100% ownership interest in a condominium project located in Ogden 
Weber County, Utah, under the name Valley Terraces. The evidence 
supports the finding that the Valley Terraces project was principal 
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i project of the Plaintiff. Defendant has not participated in 
i venture financially, except when her inheritance was used, 
:hout her knowledge and consent, to secure a portion of the loan 
that project. When Defendant became aware that her inheritance 
I been pledged, she took the appropriate steps to withdraw her 
nds, and other security was submitted. While this project has 
t been successful financially, it does produce income to the 
aintiff at the present time, and the Plaintiff resides in one 
the units. It appears that the corporation which owns the 
oject, less those units sold, is totally owned by the Plaintiff 
d the properties are likely to be lost through foreclosure by 
e underlying lending institutions. It appears that there is a 
tential of substantial deficiencies being assessed against the 
aintiff and/or his corporation if the property is foreclosed. 
Le majority of the project was developed while the parties were 
jparated, and as the Defendant did not invest her funds, together 
.th the fact that the project was not a marital endeavor, equity 
squires this Court to assess the liability of the loss of the 
roject against the Plaintiff if it cannot be salvaged. Likewise, 
ly income, profits or monies that might be received in connection 
Lth the project are awarded to the Plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the Valley Terraces project in Ogden, Utah, 
Dgether with any interest in any condominiums or units now held by 
he corporation or the Plaintiff in his individual capacity are 
warded to*the Plaintiff subject to any liabilities on the project, 
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including tax consequences, if any, and that the Plaintiff shall 
hold the Defendant harmless from any liability on that project 
that she may have. 
Evidence was produced that the Plaintiff claims that the 
proceeds from the sale of one of the units has been assigned by 
him to an irrevocable trust set up by Plaintiff for the benefit of 
the parties children. According to Plaintiff's testimony, a trust 
document has been prepared, but was not produced at the time of 
trial. The evidence shows that a sum is received monthly with 
regard to the sale of the aforementioned condominium unit, and that 
the Plaintiff has not placed those funds in trust. A baloon pay-
ment of approximately $51,000.00 is to be received on or about 
January 1, 198 5. The Court has insufficient evidence upon which to 
reach any type of conclusion as to whether or not the trust has 
actually been created, or whether or not the funds currently being 
received or to be received in January, 198 5 are actually part of 
the trust. Any funds that are not currently committed to a trust, 
assuming it is a legitimate trust, are awarded to the Plaintiff 
for his use and benefit in attempting to salvage the Valley Terraces 
project or satisfy his other obligations in connection therewith. 
If the funds being received and to be received are the legitimate 
property of the trust, then of course those funds should continue 
to be held in trust as indicated by the trust. 
10. During the marriage the parties acquired household 
furniture, furnishings, appliances and personal property. Plaintiff 
at the time he moved his residence to the Valley Terraces Condominiu 
Dject in Ogden, Utah, acquired furniture, furnishings, appliances 
i personal property. The Court finds it is reasonable that 
aintiff receive the furniture and furnishings, appliances and 
rsonal property in his possession at the present time. The 
fendant is to receive the furniture, furnishings, appliances 
d personal property in her possession with the exception of the 
aintiff's hand tools which were given to him by his father, 
tich the Defendant shall return to the Plaintiff forthwith. It 
> reasonable that each party be awarded their respective personal 
.othing, jewelry, effects and personal possessions. 
11. During the marriage relationship the parties incurred 
b^ts and obligations. The Court finds Plaintiff should be 
squired to assume and pay and hold Defendant harmless on the 
ebts and obligations listed on Plaintiff's Exhibit P-5, with 
he exception as to those liabilities that have been otherwise 
rovided for in these Findings of Facts, including and not limited 
o, American Express, Ogden Clinic, Arthur Frank, Edwin Jensen, 
hillips Petroleum, Castleton's, J.C. Penneys, Conoco, Sears and 
roebuck, Memorial Medical, Midland Savings, all debts and obligations 
.ncurred in connection with Valley Terraces and his separate debts 
ind obligations incurred since separation. 
12. During the marriage the parties acquired an ownership 
Interest in a 1978 Chrysler LeBaron automobile. The Court finds 
Lt is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded the 1978 Chrysler auto-
nobile, subject to the outstanding indebtedness owing thereon 
tfhich he is to assume and pay and hold Defendant harmless. The 
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Court recognizes that the Defendant will require transportation 
as the Chrysler automobile does not function at the present time 
and the cost to repair the same is substantial in relation to its 
fair market value, particularly taking into account the outstanding 
obligation that the Chrysler automobile secures. It will be 
necessary for Defendant to purchase substitute transportation with 
her share of the property division. Plaintiff is awarded the 1964 
Honda 90 motorcycle, subject to the obligation owing thereon which 
he is to assume and pay and hold Defendant harmless. 
13. The parties received Federal and State income tax refui 
for the year 1982. The monies representing the Federal 1982 income 
tax refund, less interest, are currently being held in an account 
in Idaho by the Plaintiff in the approximate sum of $10,000.00. 
Plaintiff was under order of the Court to hold these funds pending 
disposition by agreement of the parties or Court order. Plaintiff 
acknowledged that the fund is $1,500.00 short due to his withdrawal 
of interest and funds through various transfers since the Federal 
and State income tax refunds were received. The State tax refund 
of approximately $3,400.00 was being held by Plaintiff's prior 
attorney. The Court finds from the evidence presented that the 
State tax refund being held in trust may have been used to pay 
Plaintiff's attorney's fees. If so, such a distribution of the 
State income tax refund would appear to be in violation of this 
Court's order prohibiting disbursement of those funds without order 
of the Court. The Court declines to take any action with regard 
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the issue of contempt at the present time, conserving that 
ae for further determination if necessary. The Court finds, 
ing into account, the short fall admitted by the Plaintiff, 
apparent loss of $3,400.00 on the State tax refund, $7,500.00 
the amount held in the Idaho account should be immediately 
d over to the Defendant by Plaintiff as her share of the total 
ids that should be available for distribution. 
14. The record shows Plaintiff filed an individual 
leral and State tax return for the year 1983. His individual 
:urn for 1983 was not received in evidence, nor was it offered, 
that he did not have a copy of it with him at trial. The 
int 1983 tax return was received in evidence and marked Exhibit 
16. The joint 1983 return was not filed and is not accurate, 
e Court has no evidence before it as to what returns, either 
ate or Federal, Plaintiff received so as to make a distribution 
those funds. Based upon the current state of the evidence, 
tere is insufficient evidence upon which this Court can make a 
^termination as to the amount of the refunds received by Plaintiff, 
lould the parties supplement the record by stipulation with 
*gard to the 198 3 State and Federal refunds, the Court will con-
Lder this matter further. 
15. During the months of October and November and one-half 
1/2) of December, 1982, the Plaintiff used marital assets, to-wit: 
he sale of gold stock, to provide for Court ordered temporary support 
nd alimony. The stock was sold for approximately $4,000.00 and 
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provided for the temporary support order of $1,600.00 per month 
for the months above indicated. One-half (1/2) of the amounts 
received for the sale of the gold stock belong and should be credite 
to Defendant's side of the ledger. Accordingly, Defendant should 
be reimbursed $2,000.00 by the Plaintiff for that portion of the 
sale of gold stock which represented her share of that interest. 
The $2,000.00 that should be reimbursed to the Defendant by the 
Plaintiff should be paid forthwith out of the Idaho account. 
16. From the evidence presented, the Court finds Plaintiff 
is currently unable to work and is receiving disability compensation 
at the rate which has been and will be in the future of $2,000.00 
per month. In addition to the disability income received by 
Plaintiff, the Plaintiff is currently receiving rental on condominii 
Unit No. 7 in the amount of $575.00 per month. Plaintiff receives 
as interim interest payment on Unit No. 4, the condominium sold 
which has already been placed in trust for the children, the amount 
of $4 24.00 per month. From the duplex the Plaintiff currently 
receives a net disposable income of $4 50.00 per month for a total 
gross income of $3,449.00. 
17. Defendant is unemployed and has not been employed 
during the course of the marriage while raising the-parties childre 
her primary responsibility being running the household and raising 
the children of the parties. Defendant has, during the period of 
separation, however, recertified herself as a school teacher and 
has the ability to assist in her support. The evidence the Court 
received from the Defendant during the course of the trial suggests 
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t Defendant's efforts for employment indicate that her attempts 
intentions are less than satisfactory. The Defendant, if she 
to continue to live in the manner that she has been accustomed 
even during the period of separation between the parties, will 
re to actively seek and obtain employment in the field in which 
i is qualified. 
Based upon the needs of the parties, at the present time, 
* ability of Plaintiff to pay, the length of the marriage, the 
/le of living enjoyed by the parties during the course of the 
rriage and the distribution of the obligations and assets in 
is decision, the Court determines that a fair and equitable 
lount for child support is $300.00 per month per child. The 
>urt further determines that the obligation to support the 
mghter of the parties who has reached age 18 but still attends 
Lgh school, should continue up to and including the month of 
me, 1985 when the daughter graduates from high school. Child 
apport for the minor son of the parties will of course continue 
ntil such time as he reaches age 18 or completes high school, 
hich ever is longer, subject to child support ending at an earlier 
ime should the minor son be emancipated prior to his 18th birthday. 
'he Court further determines, based upon all of the present 
'ircumstances, that the Defendant is in need of and the Plaintiff 
las the ability to pay alimony in the sum of $1,000.00 per month. 
The evidence suggests that in the future Plaintiff's 
Income will decrease. The Court makes this determination on child 
support and alimony based upon the present income of the parties, 
and the present ability of the parties to generate income, and 
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that the Plaintiff has paid ongoing temporary support in the amount 
of $1,600.00 for a lengthy period of time, and in addition to that, 
has spent substantial sums each month on the two minor children, 
all evidencing Plaintiff's ability to meet the obligati n even 
though he is not actively employed and is considered disabled. 
Should Plaintiff's income decrease in the future, the Court will 
entertain an appropriate motion for modification upon a showing 
of change of circumstances. 
18. Each side has incurred substantial attorney's fees, 
it would be inequitable for the Plaintiff to be required to pay 
any sufficient portion of the Defendant's attorney's fees because 
he has been ordered to assume substantial debts and obligations, 
particularly in view of those obligations in the condominium project 
that potentially exist. Therefore, the Court determines that 
equity requires that each side bear their respective attorney's 
fees and costs. 
19. Each party, by stipulation, is to maintain the 
life insurance that they presently have in effect, and name the 
children of the parties as beneficiaries. 
20. The routine medical expenses that may be incurred 
for the children upon which the Plaintiff is paying support are 
to be paid by the Defendant with the child support payments receivec 
from Plaintiff. Extra ordinary medical expenses, orthodontic 
expenses, and matters of like nature shall be borne equally between 
the Plaintiff and Defendant. Should either party become employed 
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re medical and dental insurance is available, that party should 
ordered to obtain said insurance for the use and benefit of 
children for the period of time that the child support is 
•licable. 
21. Both parties have agreed that a mutual Restraining 
ler should be appropriate inasmuch as there is some evidence 
it the parties have made derrogatory comments to the children 
jarding the conduct of the other party. Each party should be 
strained from commenting upon the conduct of the other party 
the presence of the children. 
22. Plaintiff has two (2) retirement accounts, one with 
rst Continental Life and Accident and the other with Farm 
reau Insurance, these retirement accounts were acquired and 
cumulated during the marriage. Defendant is no longer employed 
th either First Continental Life and Accident or Farm Bureau 
surance. From the evidence presented by Plaintiff, he will 
ceive from First Continental Life and Accident Company retirement 
mefit at the retirement age of $341.95 per month. Plaintiff will 
jceive, at retirement age, from Farm Bureau Insurance, the sum 
: $354.00 per month. Plaintiff should be awarded one-half (1/2) 
: all retirement benefits presently accumulated by Plaintiff during 
le marriage relationship. Further, Plaintiff has indicated that 
3 is willing to divide the retirement benefits that he receives 
rom Farm Bureau Insurance and First Continental Life and Accident 
Dmpany with the Defendant at the time he receives such benefits. 
303 
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The Court finds that Defendant should be awarded an interest equal 
to one-half (1/2) of the retirement benefits of the Plaintiff at 
the time they are received by Plaintiff from First Continental Life 
and Accident and Farm Bureau Insurance. Should Plaintiff be 
required to bring legal action against Continental Life and Accident 
Insurance Company in an effort to obtain his retirement benefits, 
and incurs costs and attorney's fees to do so, the expenses are to 
be split between the parties. Plaintiff shall be entitled to 
deduct his costs and attorney's fees not reimbursed from the gross 
amounts received from Continental Life and Accident Insurance 
Company and submit one-half (1/2) of the net amount to the Defendant 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes 
as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction of this matter and the 
parties. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to be awarded a Decree of Divorce 
from Defendant upon the grounds of mental cruelty, which Decree is 
to become final on entry. 
3. Defendant is entitled to be awarded a Decree of Divorce 
from the Plaintiff on the grounds of mental cruelty on her Counter-
claim which Decree of Divorce is to become final upon entry. 
4. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to Defendant child 
support of $300.00 per month per child. Plaintiff should pay 
child support to Defendant for the daught r of the parties who 
has reached age 18 but is still in high school, to and including 
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month of June, 1985 when the daughter graduates from high school. 
Id support for the minor son of the parties is to continue 
il such time as he reaches age 18 or completes high school, 
.ch ever is longer, or should the minor child be emancipated 
or to his 18th birthday. 
5. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to the Defendant 
alimony, the sum of $1,000.00 per month. 
6. Defendant should be awarded judgment against the 
Lintiff for support arrearages under the temporary order of 
i Court in the sum of $2,000.00. Plaintiff should be ordered to 
.mburse Defendant this amount forthwith from the funds held by 
lintiff in the Idaho account. Each party should be awarded the 
:erest in the real properties and the personal property as 
; forth in the Findings of Fact hereinabove, which Findings of 
:t are hereby incorporated in these Conclusions of Law. 
7. Each party should be ordered to pay their own attorney's 
*s and costs incurred in this action. 
8. Each party should be ordered to execute any and all 
:uments necessary to carry out the awards of property as set 
rth in the Findings of Facts set forth hereinabove and as incor-
rated in these Conclusions of Law. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this /(& da^ of April, 198 5. 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HHy&DLEY 
v TTt 
URT: 
DeputyCtert /iMOTITY R. HANSON, 
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DISTRICT JUDGE ^ 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Bar No. 1032 
Attorney for Defendant 
660 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841-1 
Telephone: 534-1148 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DELBERT C. ARMSTRONG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOROTHY ANN ARMSTRONG, 
Defendant. 
| DECREE OF DIVORCE 
I Civil No. D 82-3694 
i Judge Hanson 
THIS CAUSE came on for trial at a regular term of the 
above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, October 11, 1984. 
Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, 
Robert A. Echard. Defendant appeared in person and was represented 
by her attorney, E. H. FanJchauser. Each of the parties were sworn 
and testified, presented witnesses and evidence to the Court, 
which evidence was concluded on October 12, 1984. More than ninety 
(90) days having lapsed since the commencement of this action; 
and the Court having taken the matter under advisement to consider 
the evidence, review and consider the exhibits received during 
the course of the trial; and the Court being advised in the premises 
adered its Memorandum Decision; and the Court, in accordance 
srewith having made and entered its Findings of Facts and 
delusions of Law; now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff, DELBERT C. ARMSTRONG, be and is hereby 
arded a Decree of Divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty 
om the Defendant, DOROTHY ANN ARMSTRONG, which Decree of Divorce 
all become final on entry. 
2. Defendant, DOROTHY ANN ARMSTRONG, be and is hereby 
arded a Decree of Divorce from the Plaintiff, DELBERT C. ARMSTRONG, 
the grounds of mental cruelty, which Decree of Divorce shall 
come final upon entry. 
3- Defendant be and is hereby awarded the care, custody 
d control of the minor child of the parties, to-wit: JAMES D. 
MSTRONG, age 14, subject to the right of Plaintiff to visit with 
e child at reasonable times and places. Plaintiff shall have 
e right to visit with the minor child as follows: 
(a) Every other weekend commencing Friday evening 
at 6:00 P.M. and continuing Sunday evening at 6:00 P.M. 
(b) Every other red letter holiday, with the 
exception of Christmas. Holiday visitation should be 
so structured to insure that the same holidays do not 
fall with the same parent each year; 
(c) Visitation on Christmas Day at 1:00 P.M. and 
continuing through 8:00 P.M. that evening; 
(d) In absence of an agreement of the parties, 
three (3) weeks during the summer when the minor son is 
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out of school during the summer recess. 
Plaintiff, when exercising his visitation with the minor son 
should consider carefully the minor son's outside interests, sports 
activities, school activities and activities with his peers which 
are important. The minor son should be consulted regarding 
visitation and it is the Court's intention that the Plaintiff be 
sensitive to the needs and obligations of the minor son in exercisii 
Plaintiff's right of visitation. 
4. Defendant be and is hereby awarded as her sole and 
separate property, the home and residence of the parties located 
at 8291 Etienne Way, Sandy, Utah, subject to the balance of the 
mortgage indebtedness owing thereon which Defendant is to assume 
and pay and subject to a lien in favor of Plaintiff against 
said property in the sum of $48,152.69 representing his share of 
the equity in and to said real property. The equity awarded to 
Plaintiff in and to said real property shall be due and payable 
six (6) months from the occurrence of any of the following events: 
(1) Defendant remarries or an adult male, not a relative, cohabitat^ 
in the home; (2) the Defendant sells the residence; (3) the youngesi 
child reaches age 18 or completes high school, which ever is later. 
In the event Defendant sells the home to satisfy the Plaintiff's 
lien, one-half (1/2) of the fair and reasonable expenses in selling 
the home, including real estate commissions, will be charged againsl 
Plaintiff's equity. The lien of Plaintiff will bear no interest 
until the expiration of six (6) months beyond the happening of the 
three (3) events requiring the payment of Plaintiff's equity. If 
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e equity is not paid when due, it will bear interest at the 
ximum legal rate. Plaintiff is ordered to execute the necessary 
cuments transferring title to this real property to the Defendant 
om the Plaintiff and the creation of a written lien in the 
ount of $48,152.69 forthwith. The said real property is more 
rticularly described as follows: 
LOT 23, WILLOW CREEK SUBDIVISION NO. 2 
according to the official plat thereof 
as recorded in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office 
5. The duplex property located at 1773-1775 Hubbard 
'enue, Salt Lake City, Utah is to be sold, and from the net proceeds 
"ter payment of the outstanding mortgage owing on said property 
approximately $7,000.00, $4 0,150.00 plus additional accrued 
iterest shall be distributed to the Defendant and her sister for 
.stribution among them as they see fit. The remaining proceeds 
•om the sale of the duplex is to be divided equally between Plaintiff 
Ld Defendant. Each party should bear one-half (1/2) of the cost 
: sale, including reasonable real estate fees. Each party will 
iar their respective tax liability with regard to the sale of the 
roperty and the amounts received. Each party is ordered to 
)operate in the sale of the duplex and until such time as the sale 
:curs, Plaintiff shall continue to operate the duplex, shall be 
^sponsible for its obligations and maintenance, including and 
)t limited to, mortgage payments, and may collect and dispose of 
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the net rents as Plaintiff sees fit, insuring that the property 
is properly maintained and cared for, and to assist Plaintiff in 
the payment of the obligations of alimony and support as set 
forth in this Decree of Divorce, 
6. Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded free and clear of 
the claims of Defendant the Valley Terraces project in Ogden, Utah, 
together with any interest in any condominiums or units now held 
by the corporation or the Plaintiff in his individual capacity, 
subject to any and all liabilities including tax consequences, 
if any, and the Plaintiff is ordered to hold the Defendant harmless 
from any and all liability on the Valley Terraces project. 
7. From the evidence and testimony produced by Plaintiff 
proceeds from the sale of one of the units of the Valley Terraces 
project has been assigned by Plaintiff to an irrevocable trust 
set up by Plaintiff for the benefit of the parties children. 
Plaintiff is to receive a baloon payment of approximately $51,000.0( 
in January, 1985. Any funds that are not currently committed to 
the trust, assuming it is a legitimate trust, are awarded to the 
Plaintiff for his use and benefit in attempting to salvage the 
Valley Terraces project or satisfy his other obligations in connect: 
therewith. If the funds being received by Plaintiff and to be 
received by Plaintiff are the legitimate property of the trust, 
then those funds are ordered to be continued to be held in trust 
by Plaintiff as indicated by the Trust and Plaintiff's testimony. 
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8. Plaintiff is awarded the furniture, furnishings, 
pliances and personal property in his possession as of the time 
trial. 
9. Defendant be and is hereby awarded all of the furniture, 
rnishings, appliances and personal property in her possession at 
e time of trial with the excpetion of Plaintiff's hand tools 
ven to him by his father, which tools Defendant shall return 
the Plaintiff forthwith. 
10. Each party is to be awarded their own respective 
rsonal clothing, jewelry and effects and personal possessions 
ee and clear of all claims of the other. 
11. Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to assume and pay 
d hold Defendant harmless all the debts and obligations listed 
i Plaintiff's Exhibit P-5, with the exception as to those liabilities 
iat have been otherwise provided for in this Decree of Divorce, 
Lcluding and not limited to, American Express, Ogden Clinic, 
"thur Frank, Edwin Jensen, Phillips Petroleum, Castleton's, 
C. Penneys, Conoco, Sears, Memorial Medical, Midland Savings, 
Ld all debts and obligations incurred in connection with Valley 
srraces and his separate debts and obligations incurred since 
iparation. 
12. Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded the 1978 Chrysler 
iBaron automobile, subject to the outstanding indebtedness owing 
iereon which he is to.assume and pay and hold Defendant harmless, 
irther, Plaintiff is awarded the 1964 Honda 90 motorcycle, subject 
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to any obligation owing thereon which he is to assume and pay 
and hold Defendant harmless. 
13. Defendant be and is hereby awarded as her share of 
the 198 2 Federal and State income tax refunds the sum of $7,500.00. 
Plaintiff is ordered to pay $7,500.00 of the amounts held by him 
in the Idaho account to Defendant forthwith as Defendant's share 
of the total funds from the 198 2 Federal and State tax refunds 
available for distribution. 
14. Defendant be and is hereby awarded judgment against 
the Defendant for support arrearages for the months of October, 
November and one-half (1/2) of December, 1982 in the sum of $2,000.1 
together with interest thereon at the judgment rate of twelve (12%) 
percent per annum from December, 1982. Plaintiff is ordered to pay 
this judgment to Defendant forthwith from the funds held by Plain-
tiff in the Idaho account, together with accrued interest. 
15. Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to pay to the 
Defendant as child support the sum of $300.00 per month until the 
minor child of the parties reaches age of majority or completes 
high school, which ever is longer, subject to child support ending 
at an earlier time should the minor son be emancipated prior to 
his 18th birthday. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to the Defendant 
child support of $300.00 per month for the daughter of the parties, 
JENNIFER ARMSTRONG, who has reached age 18 but is still attending 
high school, up to and including the month of June, 198 5, when 
the daughter graduates from high school. 
-7-
16. Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to pay to the 
fendant as alimony the sum of $1,000.00 per month. 
17. Each party is ordered to maintain the life insurance 
at they presently have in effect and name the children of the 
trties as beneficiaries. 
18. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay routine 
lical expenses that she may incur on behalf of the children 
on which the Plaintiff is paying support to Defendant. All 
traordinary medical expenses, orthodontic expenses and matters 
like nature shall be borne equally between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
the event either party becomes employed where medical and dental 
surance is available, that party is ordered to obtain said 
surance for the use and benefit of the children for the period 
time that child support is applicable. 
19. Defendant be and is hereby awarded one-half (1/2) of 
* retirement benefits of Plaintiff accumulated during the marriage 
Lationship with First Continental Life and Accident Insurance 
npany and Farm Bureau Insurance Company. Plaintiff is ordered 
pay over to Defendant one-half (1/2) of the benefits received 
Plaintiff at retirement age from First Continental Life and 
:ident Insurance Company and Farm Bureau Insurance Company when 
:h benefits are received by Plaintiff. Should Plaintiff be 
luired to bring legal action against Continental Life and Accident 
surance Company in an effort to obtain his retirement benefits, 
1 incurs costs and attorney's fees to do so, the expenses are 
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to be split between the parties. Plaintiff shall be entitled to 
deduct his costs and attorney's fees not reimbursed from the gross 
amounts received from Continental Life and Accident Insurance 
Company and submit one-half (1/2) of the net amount to the Defendani 
20. Each party is ordered to assume and pay their own 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action. 
21. Each party be and is hereby mutually restrained from 
making any derrogatory comments to the children of the parties 
regarding the conduct of the other party, and is further restrained 
from commenting upon the conduct of the other party in the presence 
of the children. 
22. Each party is ordered to execute any and all documents 
of title, deeds or other papers necessary to carry into effect 
the awards of real and personal property and the orders of this 
Court as set forth in the Memorandum Decision of the Court, the 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and this Decree of Divorce 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this day of April, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
.led to Robert A. Echard, Attorney for Plaintiff, 635 25th Street, 
len, Utah 84401, in accordance with Rule 2.9 of Rules of Practice, 
this 3" day of April, 1985. 
^ T L J U C A A I . 2A._ 
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Robert A. Echard 
Attorney for Defendant 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
801-621-3317 
Salt Lake County. Utah 
MAY 2 ! 1985 
H. Dugp H*no<ay, Cjptk 3rd Dist Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DELBERT C. ARMSTRONG 
Plaintiff/ 
vs. 
DOROTHY ANN ARMSTRONG, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE 
Civil No. D 82-3694 
LAW OFFICE OF 
ridley, Echard 
&Ward 
35 - 25TH STREET 
3DEN, UTAH 84401 
The defendants Order to Show Cause came on for hear 
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, on the 4th day of Apr 
1985, at 3:00 p.m. The Plaintiff was present in Court with 
attorney, Ephram H. Fankhauser, and the Defendant was present 
court with his attorney, Robert A. Echard. The Court hav 
heard testimony from the parties and being full informed of 
premises, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That the duplex belonging to the party shall be pla 
with the real estate agent for sale immediately. The Plaint 
shall provide to the defendant a list of three real estate age 
in the Salt Lake area. The Defendant shall select one of s 
real estate agents with whom the property shall be listed. 
2. That the property shall be listed at the value placed 
upon in by the Court in its Findings and Facts and Conclusions of 
Law. 
3. That the defendant shall have the first right of 
refusal and to match any offer made against the property; 
provided, however, that the defendant must be willing to pay the 
same price and comply with the same terms and conditions as any 
offer made on the property* 
4. That the real estate listing shall be for no more 
than three months. 
5. That the Plaintiff shall have the right to manage and 
collect the rents from the duplex. From these sums the Plaintiff 
shall be required to keep the building in reasonable condition 
but shall not be required to repaint or make improvements on the 
premises other than is necessary to rent the same. 
6. That the expenses set forth by the Defendant in her 
Exhibit D-l are_ reasonable, and in addition to those the 
Defendant shall be entitled to reimburse herself in the 
approximate sum of $17.05 for repairs made to the duplex. That 
the balance of moneys on hand at the time of the court hearing 
shall be turned over to the Defendant immediately. In addition, 
the Defendant shall turn over to the Plaintiff any and all rents 
she has collected for the month of April 1985. 
7. That the Defendant shall not be entitled for any 
reimbursement for time or travel incurred in managing the duplex. 
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8. That the Plaintiff shall be required to maint 
records concerning the rents and expenses on said duplex un 
such time as it is sold. 
9. Each party shall assume and pay their own attorne 
fees and court cost for this part of the Order Show C* 
hearing. 
10. That a hearing pertaining to t#e modification of 
alimony and child support is continued t/o be heard on TuescJ 
the 28th of rfay at 2:30 p.m. 
DATED thi s jV day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
9 m^M^//^. 
t . H.' EKankhauser 
Attorney for Defendant 
<r 
AYTIST 
Deputy Cl« h 
